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UP IN THE AIR: HARMONIZING THE 
SHARING ECONOMY THROUGH  
AIRBNB REGULATIONS 
JOHANNA INTERIAN* 
Abstract: The practice of opening up one’s home to accommodate strangers is 
not new, but it has been revitalized and expanded through the sharing economy 
and—in particular—through the technology-based platform Airbnb. Despite 
marketing itself as a tool to connect people across the world, Airbnb has dis-
tanced itself from responsibility to its users and the communities in which it op-
erates. As a leader in the sharing economy, Airbnb should be liable for limited 
actions of hosts consistent with the externalities generated by transient home 
sharing. A number of European cities serve as a model for how U.S. jurisdictions 
can respond effectively to the growing demand for short-term housing through 
Airbnb while also taking into account the externalities that the platform imposes 
on the permanent housing market. Moreover, the pervasiveness of Airbnb, and 
the sharing economy as a whole, exposes deficiencies in the federal laws that 
govern online behavior, revealing the necessity for such laws to be revisited.  
INTRODUCTION 
From parking spots to pet sitting, Internet-based sharing applications (or 
simply, “apps”) have expanded over the years to cover a diverse range of in-
dustries.1 The sharing economy taps into an existing base of items that people 
already own.2 Also known as the peer-to-peer economy or collaborative con-
sumption, the sharing economy’s appeal—and, in many instances, its profita-
bility—derives from its users repurposing something that they have in excess 
(or at least a comfort that they can spare) and putting it to use for someone 
                                                                                                                           
 * Johanna Interian is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
 1 See, e.g., PARKER BY STREETLINE, http://www.theparkerapp.com [http://perma.cc/3G75-
DQFQ] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (parking spots); DOGVACAY, http://dogvacay.com [http://perma.
cc/F23K-T59W] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (pet sitting); Bret Swanson, The Choice Between Uber 
and Uber-Regulation, TECH POL’Y DAILY (June 11, 2014), http://www.techpolicydaily.com/
communications/choice-uber-uber-regulation [http://perma.cc/9F8K-P9UH]. 
 2 KOOPMAN ET AL., MERCATUR CENTER AT GEO. MASON UNIV., THE SHARING ECONOMY AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION REGULATION: THE CASE FOR POLICY CHANGE 4–5 (2014); The Sharing 
Economy: Boom and Backlash, ECONOMIST (Apr. 26, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/
business/21601254-consumers-and-investors-are-delighted-startups-offering-spare-rooms-or-rides-
across-town [http://perma.cc/54XE-NSZ5]. 
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with a corresponding need.3 Whether it is a bed for the night, a vacuum for an 
hour, or a private bathroom for a moment, the sharing economy can satisfy a 
dizzying array of demands.4 Indeed, “Creative minds, significant advances in 
technology[,] and a down economy together have led to astonishing changes in 
the way services are offered and delivered.”5 The sharing model does not re-
quire a centralized entity to carry inventory and is therefore free from the cost-
ly logistics associated with maintaining inventory—such as parking or stor-
age—product maintenance, and geographic expansion.6 By allowing individu-
als to capitalize on the unused capacity of an asset they already own, the col-
laborative consumption model eliminates waste in a cost-efficient and conven-
ient way.7 With an estimated $3.5 billion in revenue generated in 2013, the 
peer-to-peer sharing economy has created markets out of goods or services that 
otherwise would not have been monetized.8 
The sharing economy is praised for its benefits to consumers in addition 
to its economic benefits.9 Ridesharing applications, for example, provide more 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES (Jan. 23, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-
share-economy [https://perma.cc/84PX-4WN2]; see also The Sharing Economy: Remove the Road-
blocks, ECONOMIST (Apr. 26, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21601257-too-many-
obstacles-are-being-placed-path-people-renting-things-each-other-remove [http://perma.cc/775Z-
VLZR]. By allowing both guests and hosts to rate and review their experiences, the company pro-
motes accountability and a sense of confidence in the service. See KOOPMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 
15. Reputational feedback empowers consumers because it narrows the information gap between the 
consumer and the provider of the product or service and creates an incentive for the provider to strive 
for customer satisfaction. See id. at 15–16. In 2014, Airbnb removed over 2000 listings in New York 
City in part because the hosts failed to provide an authentic and meaningful experience to their guests. 
See David Hantman, Working Together for Home Sharing in New York City, AIRBNB PUB. POL’Y 
BLOG (Jan. 20, 2015), http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/working-together-home-sharing-new-york-city/ 
[http://perma.cc/36CR-TZ2H]. 
 4 See Arun Sundararajan, From Zipcar to the Sharing Economy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 3, 2013), 
https://hbr.org/2013/01/from-zipcar-to-the-sharing-eco [https://perma.cc/BMP3-WUFH]; Melissa 
Kravitz, Rent a Potty in NYC: Airpnp Lets People Pay to Use Strangers’ Toilets, AM NEW YORK 
(Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.amny.com/lifestyle/rent-a-potty-in-nyc-airpnp-lets-people-pay-to-use-a-
strangers-toilets-1.9825647 [http://perma.cc/2N6E-46QT]. 
 5 Defendant Uber’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and Supporting Brief at 20, Ramos 
v. Uber Techs., Inc., 2015 WL 758087 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 5:14-CV-00502-XR) [hereinafter Uber 
Motion to Dismiss]. 
 6 See KOOPMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4–5; Sundararajan, supra note 4. 
 7 See KOOPMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 14. 
 8 Liran Einav, Professor, Stan. Univ., The Economics of Peer-to-Peer Internet Markets, in Federal 
Trade Commission Workshop: The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and 
Regulators 11 (June 9, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_events/636241/sharing_economy_workshop_transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EBG-8HRP]); 
Geron, supra note 3. 
 9 See Hantman, Working Together for Home Sharing in New York City, supra note 3; Letter from 
Andrew I. Gavil, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, Fed. Trade Comm’n, et al., to Jacques P. Lerner, 
Gen. Counsel, D.C. Taxicab Comm’n 1–3 (June 7, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter FTC Let-
ter]. 
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transportation options to people and empower individuals to make more re-
sponsible choices that measurably reduce incidences of drunk driving.10 
Despite their purported benefits, however, sharing-economy companies 
have been criticized for the way they operate and, in some cases, have been 
forced to shut down operations.11 Critics allege that they are evading laws in-
tended to regulate certain practices or businesses in which the companies are 
engaged.12 Users of sharing platforms are transformed into “prosumers,” peo-
ple who produce as well as consume.13 By blurring the line between consumer 
and producer, the sharing economy disrupts the traditional model of business 
where companies own and people consume.14 Moreover, the sharing concept 
erodes disinterested public regulation by either substituting it for private regu-
lation or leaving a void of no regulatory oversight.15 Because transactions in 
the sharing economy do not fit squarely into the realm of public regulation, 
many sharing-economy activities continue unregulated or are self-regulated by 
the very companies participating in the activity.16 
As sharing-economy start-ups become more widespread, they may reach 
the point of displacing or even eliminating their long-established, regulated 
counterparts.17 There is probably no better example of this than the ridesharing 
application Uber, which has become ubiquitous in large cities across the Unit-
ed States and abroad.18 Uber’s smartphone application allows people who are 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See FTC Letter, supra note 9, at 1–3; UBER & MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING (MADD), 
UBER AND MADD REPORT 8 (Jan. 2015), https://blog.uber.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Uber
MADD-Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/RM4B-2FGR]. The Uber and Mothers Against Drunk Driving 
(MADD) Report shows that drunk-driving car accidents decreased by 6.5% among drivers under 30 in 
the cities where UberX operates since its California launch in the summer of 2012. UBER & MOTHERS 
AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING (MADD), supra. In Seattle, Uber’s launch coincided with a 10% decrease in 
arrests for driving under the influence. Id. at 3. 
 11 See David Jolly, Uber Is Ordered by Spain and Thailand to Halt Operations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/technology/uber-is-ordered-by-spain-and-thailand-to-
halt-operations.html [http://perma.cc/9DVN-DPAZ]; Claire Cain Miller, When Uber and Airbnb Meet 
the Real World, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/upshot/when-uber-
lyft-and-airbnb-meet-the-real-world.html [http://perma.cc/W8H4-93GU]. 
 12 See David Streitfeld, Airbnb Listings Mostly Illegal, New York State Contends, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/business/airbnb-listings-mostly-illegal-state-
contends.html [http://perma.cc/X9KM-WBE6]. 
 13 Giorgos Kallis, Airbnb Is a Rental Economy, Not a Sharing Economy, PRESS PROJECT (Oct. 
24, 2014), http://www.thepressproject.net/article/68073/AirBnb-is-a-rental-economy-not-a-sharing-
economy [http://perma.cc/6L8W-AYEL]. 
 14 See Sundararajan, supra note 4; Geron, supra note 3. 
 15 See Joshua Gans, Professor, Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., Univ. of Toronto, Sharing Economy Plat-
forms: Market Design and Market Structure, in Federal Trade Commission Workshop: The “Sharing” 
Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and Regulators, supra note 8, at 26. 
 16 See id. at 25. 
 17 See Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb 
on the Hotel Industry 2 (B.U. Sch. Mgmt., Research Paper No. 2013-16, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366898 [http://perma.cc/D2QY-J683]. 
 18 See Geron, supra note 3. 
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looking for a ride to connect with people who are looking to provide rides with 
their own vehicles in order to earn income.19 Recently valued at $51 billion, 
Uber has increased in value faster than both Facebook and Google to become 
one of the most profitable start-ups in the United States.20 Lately, however, the 
popular ridesharing application has been on a bumpy road, facing legal chal-
lenges in various cities worldwide.21 
Another one of the most prominent platforms to emerge from the sharing 
economy is Airbnb, which allows people seeking temporary accommodations 
to connect with individuals willing to rent space in their homes.22 Apart from 
allowing would-be hotel guests to find more affordable lodging on its platform, 
Airbnb claims that it produces economic growth for the cities in which it oper-
ates.23 Airbnb purportedly encourages people to venture into areas less fre-
quented by tourists and to travel when they would otherwise stay home.24 Alt-
hough other home-sharing online platforms have emerged, Airbnb’s growth—
both in terms of geographical reach and profit margins—makes it the irrefuta-
ble leader of the home-sharing apps industry.25 
This Note focuses on Airbnb as a leader in the sharing economy and ar-
gues that Airbnb should be held liable for limited actions of hosts that are con-
sistent with the externalities typically associated with transient home sharing. 
Part I of this Note provides background on the sharing economy and an over-
view of Airbnb. Part II discusses the regulations implemented in various juris-
dictions in both the United States and Europe following the arrival of Airbnb. 
It presents a discussion of the various legal frameworks that typically govern 
relationships resembling, though not squarely matching, those between Airbnb, 
its hosts, and its guests. Part III argues that Airbnb’s simultaneous uniqueness 
and resemblance to traditional legal relationships calls for limited duties and 
regulations to apply. 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Uber Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 3. 
 20 Al Ramadan et al., Behind Uber’s Soaring Value, FORTUNE (Dec. 11, 2014), http://fortune.
com/2014/12/11/behind-ubers-soaring-value/ [http://perma.cc/7CW6-HDD6]; Scott Austin et al., The 
Billion Dollar Startup Club: All Companies as of October 2015, WALL ST. J., http://graphics.wsj.com/
billion-dollar-club/ [http://perma.cc/5DED-TDPG] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
 21 See Jolly, supra note 11; Douglas MacMillan et al., Airbnb Weighs Employee Stock Sale at $13 
Billion Valuation, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/airbnb-mulls-employee-
stock-sale-at-13-billion-valuation-1414100930 [http://perma.cc/3VG2-W6T2]. 
 22 See The Sharing Economy: Boom and Backlash, supra note 2. 
 23 See Hantman, Working Together for Home Sharing in New York City, supra note 3. 
 24 See id. 
 25 See Ramadan et al., supra note 20. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. “The New, Old Way to Travel”: The Rise of Airbnb 
Founded in San Francisco in 2008, Airbnb allows people to list living 
spaces and accommodations in order to host travelers for anywhere from one 
day to several months.26 It is a self-proclaimed “global community market-
place that connects travelers seeking authentic, high-quality accommodations 
with hosts who offer unique places to stay.”27 Although the concept of sharing 
underutilized space is not new, Airbnb has multiplied these interactions expo-
nentially.28 Co-founder Brian Chesky speaks of the innovative start-up with an 
air of nostalgia, referring to Airbnb as “the new, old way to travel.”29 He fond-
ly recalls stories his late grandfather told him about traveling as a kid and stay-
ing in boarding homes: “[N]eighbors shared what they had, and ordinary peo-
ple powered the economy . . . .”30 These activities are reemerging through the 
new movement of the sharing economy, which is powered by ordinary people 
and software application-based platforms.31 In its inaugural year, Airbnb (then 
operating as AirBed and Breakfast) provided accommodations for more than 
600 people attending the Democratic National Convention when traditional 
accommodations in Denver were overbooked.32 Now, the home-sharing pio-
neer operates in more than 34,000 cities across the world.33 The company prof-
its from transactions that are conducted through its platform by way of a flat 
3% commission from hosts and a fee that ranges between 6 and 12% of the 
reservation cost from guests.34 
Studies suggest that Airbnb is impacting—if not transforming—the hospi-
tality industry, particularly for budget and lower-end hotels.35 In some markets, 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us [https://perma.cc/VAK7-
PS9S] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
 27 AIRBNB PUBLIC POL’Y BLOG, http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com [http://perma.cc/9LFA-BD3R] 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
 28 See Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the Sharing 
Economy, 58-SPG BOS. B. J. at 6, 6; Zervas et al., supra note 17, at 2. Airbnb claims that 11 million 
people have used its platform to find a place to stay. See The Sharing Economy: Remove the Road-
blocks, supra note 3. 
 29 Brian Chesky, Who We Are, What We Stand For, AIRBNB BLOG (Oct. 3, 2013), http://blog.
airbnb.com/who-we-are [http://perma.cc/435T-4K82]. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Uber Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 2; Chesky, supra note 29. 
 32 Erick Schonfeld, AirBed and Breakfast Takes Pad Crashing to a Whole New Level, 
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 11, 2008), http://techcrunch.com/2008/08/11/airbed-and-breakfast-takes-pad-
crashing-to-a-whole-new-level [http://perma.cc/WX8B-7MH4]. 
 33 The Sharing Economy: Boom and Backlash, supra note 2. 
 34 See OFFICE OF THE N.Y. ST. ATT’Y GEN., AIRBNB IN THE CITY 7 (2014) [hereinafter ATT’Y 
GEN. AIRBNB REPORT]; Terms of Service, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms [https://perma.cc/
66JJ-CJ6R] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
 35 Zervas et al., supra note 17, at 19. 
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Airbnb may be taking as much as 13% of the revenue that would otherwise 
flow to the industry’s most vulnerable hotels.36 Airbnb’s $25.5 billion valua-
tion represents a higher valuation than some of its largest hotel competitors—
including Wyndham Worldwide Corporation and Hyatt Hotels Corporation, 
which, in 2014, were valued at $9.4 billion and $9.2 billion, respectively.37 
Airbnb’s functional resemblance to the hospitality industry raises questions 
about how to deal with taxation, safety regulations, and other industry rules 
that bind traditional companies in the hospitality industry.38 
B. Finding a Regulatory Home for Airbnb 
The proper regulation of sharing companies like Airbnb is a novel issue 
with no consensus regarding its resolution.39 Associate Justices for the New 
York State Supreme Court, Thomas A. Dickerson and Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix, 
concede, “While Expedia, Priceline[,] and Hotwire are best defined as retailers 
and resellers and, as such, can be controlled and taxed accordingly, it is much 
more difficult to find a comparable taxing analogue for the Internet-sharing 
economy.”40 Major cities in both the United States and Europe either have be-
gun implementing regulations regarding home sharing or have launched inves-
tigations with the aim of bringing the sharing economy into compliance with 
existing laws.41 
Airbnb’s website now includes an overview of myriad local regulations 
and laws that may apply to hosts in various jurisdictions.42 Hosts may, but are 
not required, to consult these regulations when creating a listing.43 The compa-
ny’s website currently provides specific information for forty-seven U.S. cities, 
including links to where the laws are located online or which local office hosts 
can contact with questions.44 Apart from the specific laws, Airbnb warns hosts 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See id. at 4. 
 37 See Austin et al., supra note 20; MacMillan et al., supra note 21. 
 38 See The Sharing Economy: Remove the Roadblocks, supra note 3. 
 39 See Geron, supra note 3. 
 40 Thomas A. Dickerson & Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix, Taxing Internet Transactions: Airbnb and the 
Sharing Economy, 86 N.Y. ST. B.J. 49, 50 (2014). 
 41 See id.; see also DEP’T FOR COMMUNITIES AND LOC. GOV’T, PROMOTING THE SHARING ECON-
OMY IN LONDON: POLICY ON SHORT-TERM USE OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY IN LONDON (2015) (dis-
cussing the city of London); Tim Logan, Airbnb Touts Its Economic Benefits as L.A. Leaders Seek to 
Clamp Down, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-airbnb-la-20141205-
story.html [http://perma.cc/J8ZQ-EEJ7] (discussing the city of Los Angeles). 
 42 See Responsible Hosting, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/responsible-hosting [https://
perma.cc/CJX8-HAZB] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
 43 See, e.g., Arlington County, VA, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/922 [https://
perma.cc/6PUF-HCMG] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015); Minneapolis, MN, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.
com/help/article/948 [https://perma.cc/D79U-SYL4] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015); Palm Springs, CA, 
AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/907 [https://perma.cc/SU3L-9UD4] (last visited Nov. 
11, 2015). 
 44 See Responsible Hosting, AIRBNB, supra note 42. 
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that it is “important to understand and abide by other contracts or rules that 
bind you, such as leases, condo board or co-op rules, HOA [homeowners asso-
ciation] rules, or rules established by tenant organizations.”45 Airbnb urges 
hosts who are renters to refer to their lease agreements and to check with their 
landlords for other rules that may apply.46 Although the specific wording of 
regulations varies, many laws apply to stays lasting fewer than thirty days, 
which means the majority of stays booked through Airbnb would be subject to 
these regulations.47 
Airbnb claims to be “committed to working with local officials” and plans 
to continue advocating for changes that will “allow regular people to rent out 
their own homes.”48 To this end, the company already has begun collecting tour-
ist taxes from guests on behalf of Airbnb hosts in Portland, San Francisco, San 
Jose, Chicago, Washington, D.C., and Amsterdam.49 Despite these overtures, 
however, the company maintains that it is not required to collect hotel room oc-
cupancy taxes on behalf of hosts, citing guidance from tax authorities.50  
C. Legal Impacts of the Collaborative Consumption Model 
The sharing economy challenges traditional models of public regulation.51 
As a threshold matter, the status of the relationship between the parties is am-
biguous.52 Moreover, these peer-to-peer sharing marketplaces are unlike Ma-
                                                                                                                           
 45 E.g., Louisville, KY, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/918 [https://perma.cc/
TYD9-CWUJ] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015); New Orleans, LA, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/
help/article/867 [https://perma.cc/7ZNW-SBMU] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015); West Hollywood, CA, 
AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/911 [https://perma.cc/7FZC-LU4D] (last visited Nov. 
11, 2015). 
 46 See Boulder, CO, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/909 [https://perma.cc/5DNE-
XQSB] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015); Chicago, IL, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/
861[https://perma.cc/W8J6-E9K2] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015); Houston, TX, AIRBNB, https://www.
airbnb.com/help/article/905 [https://perma.cc/6FBQ-S2PD] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
 47 E.g., MALIBU, CA. MUN. CODE ch. 3.24, § 20 (Dec. 2014) (“Transient means any person who 
exercises occupancy or is entitled to occupancy for a period of thirty (30) consecutive calendar days or 
less . . . .”); see also PORTLAND, OR., ZONING CODE ch. 33.207, § 20(A) (1991); Airbnb Economic 
Impact, AIRBNB BLOG, http://blog.airbnb.com/economic-impact-airbnb/ [http://perma.cc/CXD2-
HFUT] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
 48 See, e.g., South Lake Tahoe, CA, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/917 [https://
perma.cc/S4JN-D9RR] (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). In addition to helping hosts understand the kinds 
of taxes that might apply to them, Airbnb provides income tax forms to U.S. hosts. See David Hant-
man, Working Together to Collect and Remit in Washington D.C. and Chicago, Illinois, AIRBNB PUB-
LIC POL’Y BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015), http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/working-together-collect-remit-
washington-d-c-chicago-illinois [http://perma.cc/PK5K-QFYV]. 
 49 See Hantman, Working Together to Collect and Remit in Washington D.C. and Chicago, Illi-
nois, supra note 48. In the cities of Portland and San Francisco, the company has already collected over 
five million dollars in tourist taxes from guests on behalf of Airbnb hosts. Id. 
 50 See ATT’Y GEN. AIRBNB REPORT, supra note 34, at 9. 
 51 See Gans, supra note 15, 25–26. 
 52 See Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 28, at 7. 
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cy’s, Target, and Hilton—all of which conduct business online but also have 
physical locations.53 Sharing applications exist solely in a virtual environment 
with the company operating its peer-to-peer services platform all over the 
country without any corresponding physical locations.54 The duties owed to 
various parties and non-parties in Airbnb transactions, therefore, are difficult to 
define.55 As a specific example, tort law recognizes a special relationship be-
tween an innkeeper and his guest, which gives rise to a duty of reasonable care 
of the innkeeper to protect the guest.56 An innkeeper is defined as “[s]omeone 
who, for compensation, keeps open a public house for the lodging and enter-
tainment of travelers.”57 A corporation that owns a hotel is held responsible as 
an innkeeper, whereas a salaried employee of the hotel is not liable.58 Similar-
ly, a sole proprietor who owns and operates a hotel is liable as the innkeeper.59 
Yet, in a transaction where a room in a residential apartment is offered by a 
tenant (the host) without the consent of the apartment owner (the landlord) and 
facilitated by an online platform that receives a fee from the host’s earnings 
(Airbnb), the analysis is not as clear-cut as it is in a traditional two-party trans-
action.60 At least two entities—the host and Airbnb—receive direct compensa-
tion from the transaction and contribute to providing the accommodation; on 
these facts, however, it is unclear which of the two parties bears the duty of 
reasonable care to the guest.61 
Despite the legal gray areas, it is not hard to see why the sharing economy 
has grown so expeditiously.62 As a commentator notes:  
Millennials, the ascendant economic force in America, have been 
culturally programmed to borrow, rent and share. They don’t buy 
newspapers; they grab and disseminate stories a la carte via Face-
book and Twitter. They don’t buy DVD sets; they stream shows. 
They don’t buy CDs; they subscribe to music on services such as 
Spotify or Pandora (or just steal it).63 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See Uber Motion to Dismiss, supra note 5, at 11. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See Dickerson & Hinds-Radix, supra note 40, at 50. 
 56 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 40 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2012). 
 57 Innkeeper, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 641 
S.E.2d 68, 68 (2007). 
 58 See JOHN H. SHERRY, THE LAWS OF INNKEEPERS § 2.6, at 15 (rev. ed. 1981); Innkeeper, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 59 See SHERRY, supra note 58, at 15. 
 60 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 40; Terms of Service, supra note 34. 
 61 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 40, cmt. d; Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 28, at 8. 
 62 See Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 28, at 6; Geron, supra note 3. 
 63 Geron, supra note 3. 
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Moreover, proponents of the sharing economy tend to see regulations as pro-
tecting well-established, dominant, and unsympathetic industry operators, such 
as taxicabs and hotel chains.64 Finally, even with the success of collaborative 
consumption, some corporate entities have embraced the sharing economy, 
even if only for the marketing potential a partnership offers.65 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Favorable Reception and Lesser Legal Restrictions for Technology 
Companies in the United States 
The sharing economy is credited with lowering transaction costs, increas-
ing efficiency, and encouraging both accountability and competition.66 In light 
of how these effects serve the interests of consumers, the sharing economy has 
received praise from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the agency charged 
with enforcing laws that prohibit unfair competition and unfair or deceptive 
business practices.67 The FTC notes that peer-to-peer software applications 
“may be more responsive to consumer demand, may promote a more efficient 
allocation of resources . . . to consumers, may expand demand for . . . services, 
and may reduce consumers’ transaction costs in paying for such services.”68 
The agency went on to encourage regulation of sharing software applications 
in a way that will not stifle the benefits such technologies can offer consum-
ers.69 On June 9, 2015, the FTC hosted a workshop to “examine competition, 
consumer protection, and economic issues arising in the sharing economy” in 
an effort to better understand the unique role of the growing sharing econo-
my.70   
The United States has established a friendly legal landscape for techno-
logical innovation that in turn creates high profits for U.S. companies as well 
as economic growth.71 The allure of innovation taking place in Silicon Valley 
has prompted some to compare the northern California city to Florence during 
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the Renaissance.72 Policies that encourage investment in technology have 
helped the United States become home to more start-ups valued at over one 
billion dollars than any other country.73 Addressing concerns about stifling 
innovation, the United States has ensured decreased liability for Internet Ser-
vice Providers (ISPs) through legislation such as § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA).74 Enacted in 1996, the CDA’s well-known safe harbor 
provision is credited with bringing about the modern era of Internet develop-
ment.75 Innovation-protective policies, exemplified by § 230, contribute to the 
hospitable environment for innovation in the United States, but also make es-
tablishing liability for technology platforms more elusive.76  
1. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
The U.S. Congress enacted § 230 of the CDA to encourage responsible 
practices regarding online content without discouraging the development of the 
Internet.77 Largely considered the most influential law in the development of 
the Internet, § 230 is interpreted as immunizing ISPs from liability under cer-
tain circumstances.78 The operative provision states, “No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”79 An ISP is 
defined as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any 
other interactive computer service.”80 This broad definition is understood to 
include Airbnb, which provides an interactive computer service through its 
platform to connect potential guests with hosts.81 
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The way in which § 230 has been applied to defamation cases helps clari-
fy Airbnb’s potential liability for the content posted by users on its website.82 
For online defamation cases, the ISP is held liable as a speaker of the defama-
tory content if the ISP is responsible, either in whole or in part, for creating the 
content.83 Section 230 has resulted in very little intermediary liability on behalf 
of ISPs for content posted online.84 It distinguishes between publishers of 
online content and mere distributors—much like the distinction in the offline 
world.85 Publishers are liable for defamatory speech because they are responsi-
ble for examining the content and have some editorial control over the final 
product.86 Mere distributors are generally exempt from liability because they 
distribute already-produced works.87 
Section 230 is concerned with preserving constitutional protections online 
because of the significant public interest in protecting anonymous free speech 
both offline and online.88 Imposing liability on distributors would require them 
to be substantially more involved in how they choose works to distribute in 
their stores and on their platforms.89 This obligation would be overly burden-
some on the distributor.90 Generally, the distributor is only held liable if it had 
reason to know the content was defamatory but disseminated it anyway.91 It 
was important to create broad protections for ISPs in the context of defamation 
because of the free speech element involved.92 Too much filtering of content 
for fear of liability could result in censorship of legal content and would chill 
speech online.93 
Critics of § 230 have found fault in the CDA’s perverse incentive for ISPs 
to not engage in any filtering or screening.94 This hands-off approach often 
promotes innovation at the expense of consumer protection.95 Encouraging 
ISPs not to have a filtering regime so that they will not have reason to know 
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the published content violated the law will inevitably lead to more defamatory, 
harassing, or otherwise unlawful content appearing in cyberspace.96 
In a departure from the enhanced protection of defamatory content, feder-
al courts have found that ISPs that provide users the means to violate other 
laws may not benefit from § 230 immunity.97 The Ninth Circuit held in Fair 
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC that a web-
site that plays a role in creating user profiles for people searching for and rent-
ing housing is not immune from § 230 intermediary liability if it enables dis-
criminatory housing practices.98 The Fair Housing Act (FHA) was enacted to 
provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the Unit-
ed States.99 The FHA made it illegal to refuse to rent, sell, offer, refuse to ne-
gotiate, or otherwise make unavailable or deny housing to any person because 
of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or sometimes hand-
icap.100 Although members of the court diverged in parts of their reasoning, the 
judges agreed that a questionnaire requiring users to answer in a way that ran 
afoul of the FHA was speech attributable to the website.101 The court reasoned 
that the site was helping to create the content “in part” and that this partial con-
tribution justified exposing the ISP to liability.102 In other words, providing its 
users a platform to answer questions considered discriminatory under the FHA 
could give rise to intermediary liability for the site.103 The result in Room-
mates.com indicates that although § 230 is thought to have broad applicability 
in immunizing ISPs, the ISP may nonetheless incur liability for content that it 
has a hand in creating.104 
C. Relationships Between Airbnb, Hosts, and Guests: 
 Rogue or Regulated? 
Whether Airbnb can be held liable for the acts or omissions of hosts de-
pends in part on whether the company’s relationship with its hosts and guests 
is more similar to that of an independent contractor, joint venture, or some-
thing else entirely.105 Airbnb is frequently placed in the same category as hotels 
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due to its role in facilitating short-term accommodations—often for out-of-
town visitors.106 Indeed, it is not unusual for Airbnb hosts to provide guests 
with amenities strikingly similar to those a hotel would offer.107 This associa-
tion with the hospitality industry creates issues regarding liability and the du-
ties Airbnb owes to guests or hosts during the course of the stay as well as af-
terwards if a claim is brought.108 Nevertheless, Airbnb is not a hotel because a 
hotel is generally defined as “an establishment providing accommodation and 
meals for payment” or, alternatively, as “a public house[.]”109 Because laws 
governing hotels—including safety requirements and tax provisions—do not 
explicitly apply to Airbnb due to fundamental differences between the entities, 
other areas of the law may dictate how Airbnb should be treated.110 
1. Independent Contractor: The Uber Defense 
One way to categorize Airbnb, and thereby to identify its potential liabili-
ties, is as an independent contractor, which is how Uber has characterized its 
relationship to its drivers in recent litigation.111 Despite the FTC’s tacit endorse-
ment of software applications that power ridesharing, Uber has encountered 
roadblocks in many of the cities in which it operates.112 In 2014, a wide variety 
of cities with different approaches to domestic policies found common ground 
on one area of domestic policy: the shutdown of Uber.113 Local governments in 
Thailand, India, and a number of European states ordered the ridesharing tech-
nology company to halt operations.114 In addition, taxi associations have brought 
lawsuits claiming violations of local laws and competition rules; individuals 
have also filed suits alleging sexual assault by Uber drivers.115 
There also has been resistance to Uber in the United States.116 Most major 
U.S. cities have long used a taxi medallion system, in which the city issues a 
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fixed number of medallions and drivers are required to own or rent a medallion 
in order to operate a taxi.117 Uber is able to offer a more affordable service be-
cause it operates without the high-priced medallion that its U.S. taxicab com-
petitors are required to lease every year.118 On December 7, 2014, Portland’s 
city government announced its intention to sue Uber and enjoin it from operat-
ing in Oregon’s largest city.119 Shortly before Portland’s threat, a Nevada judge 
issued an injunction against Uber amid accusations of unfair competition with 
taxi companies, which are required to follow strict rules regarding drivers and 
insurance.120 The Nevada Transportation Authority has since addressed this 
issue by approving permits for Uber to operate in the state.121 
Cases have been brought against Uber for various claims, including as-
saults involving its drivers, Title III discrimination against mobility-impaired 
Uber riders, and unlawful withholding of gratuity from Uber drivers.122 The 
ridesharing company has struggled to cast off responsibility for its drivers by 
claiming that they are independent contractors or simply “App-users,” rather 
than traditional service employees.123 Uber maintains that sharing-economy 
companies “merely provide a platform for people with particular skills or as-
sets to connect with other people looking to pay for those skills or assets.”124 
Uber defended this position in Lavitman v. Uber Technologies, Inc. by pointing 
to the nature of the company’s business model as well as to the driver’s owner-
ship of an independent taxi company, his ability to determine his own work 
schedule and passengers, and his use of other non-Uber dispatch services.125 
Nonetheless, the Massachusetts Superior Court found that Uber, in its motion 
to dismiss, had not met its burden of proving that the plaintiff was an inde-
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pendent contractor.126 This finding makes it unlikely that Airbnb hosts would 
qualify as independent contractors given that Airbnb places fewer restrictions 
on hosts than Uber places on drivers.127 The court adopted an expansive defini-
tion of “service employee” based on the Massachusetts Attorney General’s in-
terpretive guidance that classified taxi drivers as service employees.128  
Uber’s value has skyrocketed and its business model has continued to 
evolve despite its legal setbacks.129 Amidst orders to shut down in some juris-
dictions, Uber has expanded in others.130 In late 2014, Uber debuted its service 
in Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore and even plans to add rickshaws in In-
dia.131 The fact that Uber continues to thrive despite its unsuccessful legal bat-
tles is a testament to the difficulties inherent in bringing technology-based 
sharing companies into compliance with existing laws.132 
2. Airbnb as a Potential Joint Venture 
In New Yorkers Making Ends Meet in the Sharing Economy v. Airbnb, 
plaintiffs and former Airbnb hosts argued that the relationship between hosts 
and Airbnb constituted a joint venture.133 A joint venture is a partnership be-
tween two or more persons that is entered into for a special purpose or pro-
ject—as opposed to a general partnership for all business purposes.134 In a joint 
venture, the partners owe fiduciary duties to one another.135 The four elements 
generally understood to establish a joint venture are an express or implied 
agreement, common purpose, shared profits and losses, and equal control over 
the project.136 By applying these concepts, a joint venture gives rise to a recip-
rocal duty of loyalty—which would, as the plaintiffs argued, prevent Airbnb 
from making the decision to release private, sensitive host information without 
the host’s consent.137 
In its defense, Airbnb countered that no such relationship existed between 
the company and its hosts as all four of the necessary elements had not been 
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established.138 Specifically, Airbnb cited case law holding that, because of the 
substantial duties and obligations required in a joint venture, the absence of 
any one element is fatal.139 The company further argued that it was merely a 
facilitator and that the transfer of money cannot transform an ordinary business 
transaction into a fiduciary relationship.140 The New York court did not rule on 
the matter, and the host plaintiffs have since withdrawn the case.141 Although 
the New York court did not determine whether Airbnb is a joint venture for 
purposes of defining its liability, any court that does address this issue would 
require proof of all elements of a joint venture.142 The New Yorkers Making 
Ends Meet in the Sharing Economy plaintiffs failed to elaborate on how any of 
these elements were satisfied in the context of an Airbnb-host relationship and, 
in particular, failed to demonstrate the element of equal control between the 
hosts and Airbnb.143 
D. Mixed Reception of Airbnb in Europe 
Airbnb listings in Europe make up more than 58% of the site’s listings 
and feature over 500,000 properties across the continent.144 In 2013, Hamburg, 
Germany amended its housing laws to legalize private, short-term rentals, but a 
number of European cities have placed restrictions on home sharing.145 France 
passed new housing legislation in March 2014 that allows people nationwide 
to rent out their primary residence without requiring a license, but Paris has 
more restrictive laws regarding home sharing.146 In the French capital, individ-
uals are only permitted to rent out an investment property to short-term guests 
if they also rent an equivalent property to a permanent tenant.147   
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Pursuant to recent laws, Airbnb began collecting tourist taxes on behalf of 
hosts in Amsterdam in February 2015.148 The city’s new “private vacation 
rental” category allows individuals to rent out space in their homes, so long as 
they meet certain criteria.149 The host must be registered with the municipal 
authorities as residing at that address, must pay local and national tourist taxes, 
and can only house up to four guests at one time for a cumulative duration no 
greater than sixty days per year.150 If applicable, the new regulations also ad-
vise—though do not require—homeowners to get permission from a home-
owner’s association.151 A tenant who wishes to rent out space in his or her 
home on a temporary basis must obtain the homeowner’s permission and will 
only be allowed to rent the space if his or her monthly rent exceeds €699.48.152 
In July 2014, Airbnb was fined €30,000 in the Spanish region of Catalo-
nia for breaching local laws that require any apartment rented to tourists to be 
registered with the Tourism Registry.153 Local laws also prohibit renting rooms 
in private residences in the region, which includes the popular tourist destina-
tion of Barcelona.154 Despite this setback for Airbnb, the Government of Cata-
lonia, in October 2014, committed to study the sharing economy and potential-
ly to devise new rules for home sharing.155 
Under a new Berlin law that went into effect on May 1, 2014, residents 
wishing to rent to transient occupants must register with the municipal authori-
ties.156 An automatic two-year grace period began on the date of enactment for 
any homes that were already being rented on a transient basis.157 The new law 
outlines an approval process whereby individual districts are given discretion 
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to grant authorization for short-term rental on the condition that “overriding 
public interests or legitimate private interests outweigh the public interest in 
the conservation of the living space concerned or when through the creation of 
adequate alternative housing in exceptional cases the misused housing loss is 
compensated.”158 
The relatively restrictive laws passed in Paris, Amsterdam, and Berlin 
signal that these cities are approaching short-term home sharing cautiously and 
purposefully.159 The priority is not to collect taxes on what renters charge or 
even to eliminate the transient rental market altogether.160 Instead, the Europe-
an rules reflect a focus on ensuring that short-term rentals are moderate in 
length and that efforts are taken to minimize negative externalities.161 
E. Regulations in the United States 
Jurisdictions in the United States also have been moving to regulate short-
term housing, albeit with a focus on liability and tax remittance.162 Airbnb 
claims that it has remitted more than $5 million to local governments since it 
began collecting taxes.163 Recent regulations in Airbnb’s hometown of San 
Francisco have implemented several restrictions that took effect in February 
2015.164 Residents who rent out their primary residence or rooms in their pri-
mary residence must have $500,000 in liability insurance coverage, occupy the 
residence for at least 275 days of the year, obtain a business license, get a per-
mit from the city, and maintain a residence free of building code violations.165 
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Soon after San Francisco’s ordinance passed by a seven-to-four vote, Airbnb 
announced that it would start providing secondary insurance coverage to its 
hosts throughout the United States at no cost.166 
In August 2014, Portland, Oregon legalized short-term rentals in single-
family homes and introduced a number of mandatory regulations, which were 
subsequently amended in January 2015 to help enforce the newly adopted reg-
ulations.167 Notably, the Portland City Council voted to amend the definition of 
hotel to include any “house, duplex, condominium, multi-dwelling structure, 
trailer home, [and] houseboat” rented for fewer than thirty days.168 Chicago 
and Washington, D.C. began collecting hotel taxes from Airbnb in February 
2015.169 In Washington, D.C., the revenue generated from Airbnb reservations 
will go towards a convention center fund and the District’s general fund to 
support services such as the fire and police departments.170  
On its own initiative, Airbnb will automatically collect the hotel or occu-
pancy taxes from its users in specific markets and then pay the city the taxes 
owed in regular lump sums.171 This new company policy, however, may put 
Airbnb at a disadvantage when compared to other short-term home sharing 
companies, such as Vacation Rentals by Owner, if the practice does not catch 
on among its competitors or through prompt legislative changes.172 
Nashville, Tennessee approved regulations for Airbnb on February 26, 
2015.173 The approved ordinance creates a new classification called “short-term 
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rental property” and will require operators of short-term rental properties to be at 
least twenty-one years old, receive an annual permit, and provide proof of liabil-
ity insurance coverage.174 Nashville’s ordinance imposes extensive regulations 
on home sharing in the city by allowing no more than four sleeping rooms to be 
rented at a time, limiting stays to thirty days or fewer, limiting the number of 
guests to two per sleeping room, and prohibiting food service.175 It also restricts 
signage, noise, and parking associated with the short-term stay.176 The swift ap-
proval of this regulation followed a decision in November 2014 by Nashville 
Mayor Karl Dean to begin collecting hotel tax revenue from Airbnb hosts.177 
F. Investigation in New York City 
In addition to the cities that have begun to impose specific restrictions on 
short-term home sharing, New York City is currently assessing whether Airbnb 
should be required to pay hotel tax and whether its operations violate various 
housing laws.178 The City of New York estimates that it is owed over $33 mil-
lion in outstanding hotel room occupancy taxes since the company started op-
erating in the city in 2010.179 According to a study commissioned by Airbnb, 
however, the accommodations sharing platform was responsible for generating 
an estimated $768 million in economic activity in New York City in 2014 
alone.180  
Airbnb claims that inexpensive lodging and increased access to accom-
modations in areas less frequented by tourists have helped stimulate the local 
economy.181 Airbnb guests stay longer, on average, than tourists staying in ho-
tels and are more likely to return on later trips.182 Airbnb projected that New 
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York City would lose out on $65 million in potential tourism-related tax reve-
nue in 2015 if it were to shut down the home-sharing site altogether.183  
The situation in New York is unique, however, because the city has a high 
number of strict co-ops and subsidized housing units in areas of high rent.184 A 
September 2014 opinion poll revealed sharp divisions among New Yorkers 
about companies like Airbnb.185 Fifty-six percent of city residents believe they 
should be allowed to rent rooms to strangers like a hotel.186 A Manhattan 
Housing Court judge, however, ruled in February 2015 that rent-stabilized ten-
ants cannot profit from their reduced rent units by renting out on a short-term 
basis on websites such as Airbnb.187 
In May 2014, New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman is-
sued a subpoena to Airbnb to investigate the company for potential illegal 
rentals and for failure to pay required state and local taxes.188 Concerned that 
the government would go after them instead of or in addition to the company, 
Airbnb hosts filed an anonymous suit against Airbnb in which they collectively 
referred to themselves as “New Yorkers Making Ends Meet in the Sharing 
Economy.”189 They argued that Airbnb had no contractual right to release any 
information to the Attorney General and that it was merely trying to “protect 
itself by using the Plaintiffs as sacrificial lambs[.]”190 The May 2014 subpoena 
was quashed as overbroad, but the company reached an agreement with the 
Attorney General to release limited information, giving the Attorney General 
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one year to seek further motions based on the information.191 On July 28, 
2015, the New Yorkers Making Ends Meet in the Sharing Economy plaintiffs 
indicated they were on the brink of a “mutually acceptable resolution” with 
Airbnb, and the motion for a preliminary injunction was dismissed without 
prejudice on October 7, 2015.192 
Using data received from Airbnb and affidavits from interested parties, 
the New York Attorney General’s Office issued an in-depth report (NYAG Re-
port) in October 2014 highlighting the myriad property use, safety, and tax 
laws that Airbnb or its users potentially violate.193 For example, the New York 
State Multiple Dwelling Law prohibits apartment rentals of fewer than thirty 
days unless a permanent resident is present during the rental period.194 Addi-
tionally, depending on the length of stay and whether the home is owner-
occupied, Airbnb rentals may be subject to the New York City Hotel Occupan-
cy Tax and the city’s Unincorporated Business Tax.195 The New York City Fire 
Department’s Chief of Fire Prevention also cautioned that transient residential 
occupancies are required to be designed, constructed, and operated in accord-
ance with more stringent fire protection requirements than permanent resi-
dences because transient visitors are generally unfamiliar with the building 
layout and exits.196 The risks of fire and personal safety are heightened when 
short-term occupancy is combined with overcrowding or obstructed passage-
ways.197 
The NYAG Report exposes concerns that private short-term rental units in 
New York City are not only serving as illegal hostels and hotels, but are also dis-
placing long-term housing in thousands of apartments and significantly reducing 
the supply of affordable housing.198 The report identified 12 buildings in the 
boroughs of Brooklyn and Manhattan that had at least 60% of their units dedi-
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cated to private short-term rentals, suggesting they operated as de facto hotels.199 
There is a lot at stake for Airbnb and its hosts in New York City, as bookings in 
Manhattan alone generated a total of $338 million for hosts from January 2010 
through June 2014.200 The revenues Airbnb collected from units that were indi-
vidually booked for more than half the year increased thirty-seven-fold in a span 
of 3 years, from $270,000 in 2010 to $10 million in 2013.201 
Defending their position against allegations that Airbnb undermines af-
fordable housing are a number of Airbnb hosts who claim that renting out 
space in their homes allows them to make their monthly rent or mortgage 
payments.202 This view that Airbnb is a lifeline for struggling homeowners and 
tenants reflects the origins of the company, which began as a remedy for recent 
graduates struggling to make rent payments.203 What started as a way for two 
young San Francisco transplants to solve their own financial problem became 
an experiment that inspired the launch of Airbnb.204 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Airbnb Is Not Immune from Liability 
1. The Airbnb-Host Relationship Is Not Captured by the Traditional Legal 
Frameworks 
Prosumers who use the services of sharing-economy companies often are 
able to evade liability because of the difficulty in applying laws—which were 
written for the offline world—to virtual spaces.205 In suits brought against Ub-
er, the company continues to reiterate its lack of operational control over users 
of its smartphone application.206 Uber also emphasizes that it does not provide 
transportation services directly to the public; purchase or lease vehicles; plan 
service routes; or hire, fire, or otherwise manage the people who log onto its 
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app.207 The company further argues that its lack of a physical location causes 
its activities, which take place in “virtual environments[,]” to not be subject to 
laws of local jurisdictions or even federal laws.208 
The unworkability of certain laws as applied to technology-based peer-to-
peer companies arose in Ramos v. Uber Technologies, Inc., where the company 
contended that it could not alter its smartphone application to make accommo-
dations for mobility-impaired users.209 Because Uber drivers who use the app 
to search for potential riders are beyond the control of Uber, the company 
claimed that it could not be held liable when those drivers refused to offer rides 
to individuals in wheelchairs who are statutorily entitled to special accommo-
dations under the American with Disabilities Act.210 Uber maintained that the 
statute did not apply to the ridesharing company, claiming that Uber was not a 
“taxi” service as defined in the statute.211 In essence, the company’s distance 
from these operational activities creates a shield, it argues, that permits it to 
escape liability.212 The District Court for the Western District of Texas was not 
convinced, finding that the requirements of having a valid driver’s license, car 
insurance, clean driving record, and four-door vehicle all point to some level 
of control over Uber drivers.213 The court also commented that referring to its 
drivers as independent contractors makes it appear “disingenuous for Uber to 
protest that it does not and cannot exert any control over its drivers.”214 Simi-
larly, the Massachusetts Superior Court recognized that users of the sharing 
economy can sometimes more closely resemble employees than independent 
contractors of the company.215 
Nonetheless, the reasoning in Ramos suggests that Airbnb may not exer-
cise sufficient control over its users because the requirements to become an 
Airbnb host are substantially less specific and demanding than those to become 
an Uber driver.216 Uber drivers ultimately determine who they let into their 
vehicle just as hosts control who can book their listing, but unlike Uber drivers 
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who are subject to pricing determined by the company, Airbnb hosts determine 
the cost at which a guest can stay overnight.217  
In comparison to Airbnb, Uber appears to exert more control over its us-
ers.218 The strongest example of this heightened control is the background 
check that drivers must pass to be accepted by Uber.219 Airbnb administers no 
comparable fitness test or screening.220 This discrepancy may be attributable to 
the type of service being provided because driving and the taxicab industry are 
both highly regulated, whereas hospitality regulations are often relaxed or oth-
erwise inapplicable to home swapping or home sharing.221 The price scheme 
that Uber employs also distinguishes it from Airbnb’s business model.222 Uber 
sets prices for rides that include a base fee and an amount per distance, which 
is based on supply and demand at the time the ride request is made.223 In con-
trast, Uber drivers do not have a direct input into the price determination; 
Airbnb hosts alone determine the price they wish to charge and Airbnb collects 
a portion of the total amount as its service fee.224 
Uber’s emphasis on its lack of a physical location is beside the point be-
cause functionally, its software affects real-world interactions.225 Sharing 
economies have real effects on commerce and, for better or worse, on the peo-
ple who participate in those transactions.226 Additionally, in the case of Airbnb, 
there are effects on people wholly outside of the transaction—including neigh-
bors and landlords who endure transient occupants and members of the com-
munity who suffer when the housing market is adversely affected by the sys-
tematic conversion of residential units to transient use.227  
Moreover, the Airbnb-host relationship is not a joint venture.228 While the 
relationship arguably meets the first three elements—express or implied 
agreement, common purpose that the group intends to carry out, and shared 
profits and losses—there is no equal control over the project.229 There is an 
imbalance of the rights and responsibilities between the company and the host, 
with the host having a greater degree of control over the renting of the property 
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itself.230 Thus, the elements for a joint venture are not satisfied.231 Given that 
the independent contractor and joint venture relationships emphasize control, 
alternative means of imposing liability that likewise focus on control should be 
considered.232 
2. Control in Airbnb-Host Relationships Does Not Preclude Airbnb from 
Liability 
Precedents set by European governments may inform the direction that 
U.S. cities will take as the market presence of sharing economies continues to 
increase.233 Despite the difficulty of regulating Airbnb through traditional legal 
frameworks, there ought to be parameters within which it must operate.234  
Airbnb’s involvement in its home-sharing listings is increasingly evolving 
to the level of control necessary to give rise to liability by “contribut[ing] ma-
terially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.”235 In some U.S. cities, Airbnb 
has started to help hosts meet their tax obligations by including applicable ho-
tel or tourist taxes into the price of listings.236 Collecting and remitting taxes 
on behalf of hosts also represents a greater degree of control than Airbnb had 
previously exhibited on pricing, making Airbnb more than a “passive transmit-
ter of information provided by others[.]”237 This move also brings Airbnb’s 
practices closer to those of Uber, which some courts have determined exerts a 
level of control sufficient to establish liability for complying with applicable 
laws.238 Perhaps most importantly, remitting taxes on behalf of its users serves 
as an indicator of Airbnb’s essential role in the transient housing market—not 
just as a detached facilitator but as an indispensable participant in the transac-
tion.239 
As further evidence of Airbnb’s growing control over its hosts and users, 
its website currently provides detailed information about the various re-
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strictions, rules, and taxes that may apply to listings in over forty U.S. cities.240 
Airbnb is on notice of the different rules that affect listings and could modify 
its software to detect when a specific location is subject to a particular license 
requirement or tax obligation and comply accordingly.241 Because hosts must 
furnish a physical address when creating a listing, Airbnb is aware of the loca-
tion of that particular listing.242 At the host’s request, an Airbnb representative 
can personally go to the host’s home to take photos of the space, which are 
then labeled as an “Airbnb.com Verified Photo” on the listing.243 There is also 
a mechanism for users to verify their identity by submitting a photograph of a 
government-issued ID, which is displayed as “User Verified” on the listing.244 
These verification methods represent ways in which Airbnb is closing the con-
trol gap between the company and the host.245 
From a technological perspective, remitting taxes shows that Airbnb is 
capable of easily and effectively ensuring that its hosts comply with tax obliga-
tions arising from the transactions conducted on Airbnb’s platform.246 Courts 
consider technological feasibility when determining whether it is appropriate 
for an ISP to be liable for content appearing online.247 For example, in jurisdic-
tions that only permit residents to rent to transient guests for a limited number 
of days per year, Airbnb’s past adaptations indicate that it could be technologi-
cally feasible for Airbnb to implement reasonable controls that prevent hosts 
from exceeding their lawfully permitted annual allotment.248  
Beyond technological feasibility, Airbnb’s level of control on the content 
of its site determines whether the company is entitled to § 230 immunity.249 
Because the ISP is liable for speech that it helps to create under § 230, Airbnb 
may be exposed to liability for content posted to its home-sharing platform.250 
Airbnb elicits information about the properties listed on its website by asking 
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hosts to complete listing profiles.251 Generally, the host can free-write to de-
scribe the listing.252 Airbnb encourages hosts to “[h]ighlight what makes your 
listing welcoming so that it stands out to guests who want to stay in your ar-
ea.”253 Thus, the host inputs the detailed information at the direction of 
Airbnb—much like the homeowner in Roommates.com listed his home at the 
direction of the website.254  
In addition to the free-writing spaces, Airbnb also provides drop-down 
menus that ask for information such as number of bedrooms available, room 
type, number of guests that can be accommodated, and property type.255 The 
host determines the price, but Airbnb generates a “price tip” based on the list-
ing’s “features, location, amenities, booking history, availability, and seasonal 
supply and demand” in the area.256 Airbnb’s suggested price appears next to 
the space where the host fills in the price and can be adjusted according to the 
length of stay.257 Airbnb’s involvement in pricing and in soliciting specific in-
formation from its hosts constitutes partial development of the content that 
should preclude it from invoking § 230 immunity from liability.258 
3. Externalities Call for Either Public or Private Regulation of Airbnb 
By their very nature, Airbnb transactions have far-reaching and potential-
ly long-lasting consequences on parties outside of the transaction.259 The pro-
liferation of home sharing has caused the permanent housing stock to dwindle 
in recent years—especially in relatively expensive cities with both a high de-
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mand for long-term housing and a high volume of tourism.260 In such markets, 
homeowners or tenants find it profitable to operate as short-term transient 
housing.261 Long-term housing units are being taken out of the market due to 
the higher profit margins associated with Airbnb and the ease with which 
short-term vacancies can be filled.262 In New York City, this is particularly 
precarious because the housing market is delicate and a substantial proportion 
of the market is comprised of strict co-ops, rent stabilized units, and other 
similarly limited housing schemes.263 The emergence of platforms that simpli-
fy home sharing and make the practice so rampant must be met with private or 
public regulation that accounts for the effects created by such platforms.264 
B. Recommended Regulations 
Some European cities have been faster to respond to home sharing’s ex-
ternalities than their U.S. counterparts.265 Regulations passed in cities such as 
Amsterdam and Berlin recognize the quality of life and even the safety issues 
of having transient guests among permanent residents.266 While many regula-
tions in European jurisdictions try to remedy the permanent housing loss, regu-
lations passed in major U.S. cities thus far have focused on mandating insur-
ance coverage and collecting tourist taxes of would-be hotel guests.267 
The importance of preserving the tourist taxes from transient visitors 
should not be ignored, but it also should not overshadow the other important 
aspects of regulating Airbnb.268 As long as Airbnb stays are displacing hotel 
stays, there is a loss of potential hotel or tourist tax revenue that would other-
wise flow to the local governments to support affordable housing and munici-
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pal improvement projects.269 Thus, apart from units being removed from the 
permanent housing stock to be used for transient guests, the reduced proceeds 
from tourist taxes further exacerbates the plight in these cities.270 The fact that 
such regulations on home sharing heretofore have been nonexistent, of course, 
is not a reason to stall their promulgation.271 U.S. cities can and should look to 
European jurisdictions for methods in which Airbnb can coexist with local 
regulations in a way that is beneficial to the company, its users, and the resi-
dents affected by Airbnb’s presence.272 
 Limiting the number of days per year that a location can serve as transient 
accommodations is an easily enforceable requirement that could help alleviate 
the loss of affordable permanent housing.273 Because many cities already regu-
late transient stays longer than thirty consecutive days, formulating similar re-
strictions for short-term homestays is consistent with existing limitations.274 To 
assist in assuring compliance with the annual limit and other applicable local 
rules, homeowners or tenants wishing to rent on a short-term basis should be 
required to annually register the property with local authorities.275 In addition to 
facilitating compliance, registration would allow municipal authorities to keep 
track of the number and concentration of properties that are occupied by transi-
ent guests for part of the year.276 The Airbnb website already is set up technolog-
ically to record the total duration of stays per listing because Airbnb logs the 
length of stays in order to collect guest fees and host fees from its users.277 
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Amsterdam and Berlin are among the cities that already require registra-
tion for short-term stays.278 Berlin has announced an approval process that 
would award short-term rental licenses when it is in the public interest to do so 
or when the loss of permanent housing is compensated.279 Amsterdam current-
ly allows residents to register their primary residence for short-term stays only 
if their monthly home payment exceeds €710.68.280 Additionally, in Paris, 
there is no primary residence prerequisite for short-term rentals, but commer-
cial renters must place a permanent rental on the market for every transient 
rental they have, which severely limits the use of Airbnb in the city.281 
While these attempts at restoring balance in the housing market—such as 
the minimum monthly rent and the commercial renter obligations—are well-
intentioned, they largely would go beyond the scope of Airbnb’s practical abil-
ity to monitor every host’s compliance.282 Moreover, each regulation reflects 
the needs of the specific housing markets in particular cities and, as such, 
demonstrates that there is no one-size-fits-all model.283  
The depletion of long-term permanent housing caused by Airbnb is unlikely 
to be addressed by deregulation or a framework self-regulated by Airbnb.284 Ac-
tively addressing this issue would hinder the home-sharing economy and run 
counter to the interests of Airbnb and its shareholders.285 Airbnb failed to take 
the lead on this issue, despite having the opportunity to do so, when it released 
the Airbnb Community Compact (the Compact) in November 2015, which out-
lined the company’s commitment to qualified cooperation in cities that embrace 
home-sharing policies.286 In the Compact, Airbnb introduced its plan to start is-
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suing annual Home Sharing Activity Reports in select cities, which will contain 
anonymous data designed to help public officials “craft fair, progressive rules” 
about home sharing.287 While these reports will purportedly compile useful in-
formation on the geographic distribution of Airbnb listings and the average 
length of Airbnb stays, they will exclude any data on Airbnb’s effect on afforda-
ble housing, such as data on long-term housing units converted to short-term 
transient units or trends in average rent prices in cities with a sizable Airbnb 
presence.288 In the Compact, Airbnb acknowledged the affordable housing prob-
lem that some cities face and pledged to “work . . . to prevent short-term rentals 
from impacting the availability of long-term rental housing by ensuring hosts 
agree to a policy of listing only permanent homes on a short-term basis.”289 
Without providing greater transparency or implementing practical changes to its 
website, however, Airbnb’s empty promise will not further the company’s stated 
goals of promoting the “policy needs of a particular city” or helping guarantee 
compliance with applicable laws.290 
Restrictions that are overly burdensome on Airbnb are unlikely to be upheld 
in the United States.291 Based on the § 230 safe harbor provision and related case 
law, Congress has expressed—and the courts have affirmed—an intent to em-
brace broad protections so that interactive computer services are not held liable 
for much online content.292 It is important to recognize this motive when consid-
ering additional requirements to adopt from European jurisdictions, which are 
not limited by § 230 immunity.293 Moreover, at the time it was enacted in 1996, 
§ 230 reflected the desire to develop the fledgling Internet.294 In the nearly twen-
ty years since it has been in force, the safe harbor provision no longer serves its 
initial purpose.295 In the absence of legislative correction, the present interpreta-
tion of § 230 should reflect the Internet’s rapid development and stop protecting 
content that emphatically violates local or federal laws.296 Today, the Internet 
and technology-based applications play an unprecedented role in the daily lives 
of a large portion of the population and have in turn transformed the role of pub-
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lic regulation.297 In particular, “the internet allows us to create new opportunities 
from transactions, or to overcome some of the limitation of the traditional mar-
kets.”298 Accordingly, regulations on interactive computer services such as 
Airbnb should be embraced in a way that is practical yet proportional to their 
impact on users and the larger community.299 
CONCLUSION 
Airbnb’s simultaneous uniqueness and resemblance to traditional legal re-
lationships calls for the application of limited duties and regulations. The com-
pany should be held liable for ensuring basic compliance by using reasonable 
measures similar to what already has been implemented in numerous European 
cities. Airbnb should continue its initial efforts in ensuring host compliance 
with local laws, but this should not be limited only to remitting taxes and com-
plying with housing rules. Airbnb boasts that its platform connects people 
while simultaneously disclaiming any responsibility between it, its users, and 
the communities that its operations affect. The technology-powered sharing 
economy presents unprecedented opportunities for producers and consumers to 
enjoy a more efficient and productive coexistence. The benefits it may offer, 
however, do not validate the deterioration of systems that have been put in 
place to ensure safety and to promote a thriving and accessible residential 
housing market. Web-based platforms have become fixtures in our daily lives, 
and although they produce benefits, they can also undermine legal frameworks 
intended to promote safety, competition, and stable communities. In particular, 
the pervasiveness of Airbnb calls for updates to the laws—both federal and 
local—that govern behaviors and transactions on the company’s platform. 
                                                                                                                           
 297 See David Hantman, Head of Glob. Pub. Policy, Airbnb, The Interplay Between Competition, 
Consumer Protection, and Regulation: Business and Regulatory Views, supra note 269, at 112. 
 298 Einav, supra note 8, at 11. 
 299 See supra notes 268–283 and accompanying text. 
  
 
